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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/03/2004 Accident number: 48 
Accident time: 11:25 Accident Date: 16/09/1998 
Where it occurred: Nr Ebalanga, Huambo Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 19/09/1998 
ID original source: JB/MH/CC Name of source: HT (field) 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast Ground condition: ditch/channel/trench 
 
Date record created: 22/01/2004 Date  last modified: 22/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
use of pick (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 




The demining group are believed to have been running two-man teams with a one-man drill at 
this time. In this arrangement, the working deminer uses all the tools, including the detector, 
while his partner rests and watches, correcting any errors he may see. However, they may 
have using a one-man team at the time (as was current in 1999).  The demining group issued 
frontal protection and their drills assumed the deminer would kneel or squat while excavating. 
No formal accident report was on file at the Angola MAC. The demining group's Angola office 
provided an internal accident report prepared by three of their personnel. This report was 
unsigned and undated but another document indicated that the investigation took place 
before 19th September 1998. The report stated that a 31-man team started clearing a disused 
military position near Epalanga on 2nd September 1998. The team had located, marked and 
destroyed seven PPM-2 mines laid in a trench system (including one mine found by the victim 
on 11th September 1998).  The victim had been a deminer since 12th April 1996. 
The team started work at 07:00 and at 10:00 the Operations Officer and an ex-pat (who were 
later to carry out the investigation) arrived for a routine inspection that included the victim's 
lane. At 11:10 the Assistant Supervisor issued the victim with a recharged battery for his 
detector and when he returned to calibrate the victim's detector he also checked his lane for 
missed metal contamination.  
At 11:25 The victim initiated a PPM-2 mine and was blown backwards onto his detector. At 
11:26 the victim was given first aid and was conscious. He had suffered "facial injury and 
lacerations to right hand". One minute later he was moved to the administration area where 
he was treated for "injuries to right hand, right knee" and his face was bandaged. The victim 
was evacuated by Land Rover at 11:40 and arrived at Huambo Hospital at 12:30. On arrival 
the escort was presented with a list of medical supplies to buy. 
 
Conclusion 
Interviews were conducted with six people including the victim on the day of the accident. 
From these the investigators concluded that the victim did not use the correct detector sweep 
pattern and was working beyond the limit of 1½ detector heads in front of the end-of-lane 
marker. He did not correctly identify the signal and apparently carried out no excavation or 
probing prior to initiating the PPM-2 mine with his hoe (despite there having been a 
detection/excavation demonstration on site that morning). They concluded that the victim lied 
about the procedures he employed and the tools he used (the victim stated that he was not 
using a hoe, but examination of the tool suggested otherwise).  Also, the Casevac vehicle 
travelled too fast for the road conditions (38.5km in 35 minutes), and the string on the end-of-
lane marker was black and difficult to see. The investigators said that the hoe, if used 
correctly, is useful for excavation but not for detection tasks. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the victim deliver a presentation on incorrect mine 
clearance to other teams. They suggested that the prior preparation of "hospital packs" would 
speed up the process at admission. Also that drivers and supervisors should be briefed on 
vehicle speed during Casevac, and that only white cord should be used for end-of-lane 
markers. 
Also on file was another internal document dated 19th September 1998 with another version 
of the conclusions of the internal inquiry. It varied by observing that the incorrect use of the 
hoe was the cause of the last two accidents and stressing that it should only be used for 
excavation. It also suggested that the group "Organise a book for registry of all faults 
committed by every team (every safety rule and the discounts done)", and that teams should 
do a complete detector sweep of the area before starting excavation. 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 67 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: ot made available 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: Short frontal vest, 
Long visor 
 







No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working inappropriately and his actions went uncorrected. His improper actions included 
wearing his long, full-face visor at an angle that allowed his lower face to be injured.  
Senior management failings were demonstrated by the most senior ex-pat management 
suggesting that the deminer was not concentrating for personal reasons (see Related 
papers), rather than addressing an obvious control failure. Country management of the 
organisation involved showed more responsibility with their suggestions for preventing 
recurrence.   
 
Related papers 
A letter about another Angolan accident involving this group dated 26th September 1998 
makes mention of this accident. The investigation of the accident on 16th September 
concluded that "there was nothing amiss in [the group's] rules, supervision or conduct. The 
report will focus I believe on his mental state – his wife left him 4 days before. Cause of 
accident inattention." 
An initial notification of the accident to the Angolan MAC by the then Director of the group's 
work in Angola, written in Portuguese and dated 16th September 1998, was on file. It stated 
that the accident occurred at Epalanga, Huambro at 11:30. The victim suffered injuries to his 
right hand and foot and the lower part of his face. He was evacuated in an adapted vehicle to 
Huambo Hospital, arriving at 12:30. At the time of writing it was believed that the injuries 
would not result in amputation.  
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